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Decision-making is a complex subject in neuroscience. In the last years, considerable advances were
achieved in different fields ranging frommodulatory neurotransmitters to functional imaging, from
neuroeconomics to neuroethics. Our research topic envisages a critical view on the state-of-the-
art of decision neuroscience by means of foudational and methodological approaches to practical
and empirical science. Accordingly, we exhorted contributions that deeply analyze neuroscientific
experiments in both technical and philosophical ways aiming a broader understanding of the
relevance, scope and limitations of decision-making experiments. Moreover, we encouraged
epistemological reflections about the necessary neural mechanisms to decision-making. This topic
is constituted by the following papers:
Sip et al. (2012) addresses decision to deceive and its related social pressure. Participants in
the fMRI scaner were confronted by an opponent about his/her knowledge on a display’s content
and were rewarded for successful deception and penalized for ineffective ventures. The results, in
addition to showing, as expected, that the decision to deceive is influenced by the risk of being
detected and the social confrontation represented by the detection, also reveal that participants
were slower when taking an honest course of action instead of taking advantage of their privileged
knowledge. Also, important results concerning functional brain areas involved in the tasks are
presented.
An elegant Bayesian decision model is presented in Deneve (2012) that both infers the
probability of two different choices and simultaneously estimates the reliability of the sensory
information on which this choice is based. Trials in which the level of difficult is higher show
early sensory inputs having a stronger impact on the decision. Accordingly, the threshold collapses
such that response time is shorter, tough with lower accuracy. Easy trials, by their turn, show the
opposite: an increased sensory weight and a higher threshold over time, eliciting slower, but more
accurate, decisions. As the model advanced by the author considers adaptive sensory weights, it
could not only extract a single estimate from the sensory input, but also evaluate the uncertainty
associated with it.
Osman (2012) empirically compares Choice-based decision-making and Prediction-
based learning, showing that the former leads to more accurate cue-outcome knowledge.
The author interprets results as suggesting that the additional demand of cognitive
resources for the processing of rewards could be an explanation of its adverse effect
in the decisional process. Also, a series of philosophical considerations is forwarded
to question how generalizable is evidence from neuropsychology to psychology and
vice-versa. In this context, the relationship of intra-level and inter-level experiments is
considered.
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Nakao et al. (2012) compares and disentangle two
types of empirical protocols used for study of decisional
processes: experiments that assign to its participants tasks
in which a unique but uncertain answer is presupposed and
experiments in which no unique external cued answer could
be considered correct. The former is categorized as externally
oriented decision-making and the latter as internally oriented
decision-making. The article also uses Multi-Kernel Density
Analysis (MKDA) to contrast internally and externally guided
decisions in terms of recruitment of areas, to finally compare
commonalities and differences between the two types of
decisions.
Heinzelmann et al. (2012) discusses the practical and moral
question of inappropriate behavior considering its foundations
in both philosophical normative and descriptive domains.
The moral implication of empirical findings in neuroscience,
economics and psychology are discussed in the light of this
philosophical background aiming at an understanding of
the possible mechanisms of moral inappropriate actions
and the decisional process that leads to them. More
importantly, the paper addresses the morally important
and controversial question of interventions to promote behavior
improvement.
Taking as a standpoint Stephens and Anderson’s (2001)
already classic article, Bourgeois-Gironde (2012) aims at
considering the viability of methodological transfers from
behavioral ecology to experimental economics, including
human choice inasmuch as it is concerned with intertemporal
preferences. The author suggests that economic theories have
noticeable similarities to ecological models in their assumptions
and implications.
Lucci (2013) proposes an investigation of the subjective
component of time in intertemporal choice (IC). The author
asserts that deviations from exponential reward discounting,
as a function of time, could have as a primary factor the
deviation of subjective time from the calendar metric system
time. Time perception, she claims, could modulate discounting.
Consequently, time perception would be a fundamental
component of intertemporal choice.
In Smaldino and Richerson (2012) the authors argue
that current paradigms in neuroscience are focused on
decisions made among a previously established set of options,
although, the very generation of options has barely been
studied and still to a great extent an untapped issue. The
author considers various specific factors that could influence
the generation of options that would be categorizable
in two broadly defined domains: psycho-biological and
socio-cultural.
Volz and Gigerenzer (2012) Argues that normative strategies
used to decide under risk could not be generalized to all types
of decision-making processes. They stress that in most of the
experimental designs, the strategies to deal with risk are assumed
as implicit presuppositions even if they are not applicable. They
show that criteria for generating optimal solutions in decisional
processes under risk could not be the best whenever uncertainty
is the difficulty the agents have to cope with.
Shadlen and Roskies (2012) defends the possibility of
a reconciliation of responsibility with neurobiological
mechanism by philosophically reviewing presuppositions
and implications of recent empirical studies in neurobiology.
Instead of the more traditional account of compatibilism
based on an appeal to randomness or noise as a source of
freedom, they rather recognize that randomness could possibly
establish the background against which policies have to be
adopted.
Finally, Mograbi (2013) summarizes and critically analyses the
merits, achievements, scope and limitations of each article in
this present edition and also considers future directions in some
of those cases. It can be taken as an extension of this editorial
and constitutes a more detailed introduction to the whole
edition.
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